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This paper investigates whether or not monetary policy has been conducted e¢ -
ciently in ￿ve selected ASEAN economies. It derives a utility-consistent social loss
function, as a metric for welfare, to assess monetary policy e¢ ciency in a small open
economy model. An optimal monetary policy that minimises the social loss function
is solved using information on structural parameters estimated for a model that rep-
resents each of the selected ASEAN-5 countries. The results are largely consistent
with common wisdom in the literature, where policies based on credible commitment
give the best welfare outcome. The paper further examines the welfare implications
of the currently adopted simple monetary policy feedback rule for each of the sample
economies. This exercise points out that there is room for improving the performance
of monetary policy in each country, and it should be explored further. It also suggests
the possibility that monetary authorities in the sample countries may be optimising
over an objective function that di⁄er from the social welfare function derived in the
paper.
JEL classi￿cations: E52, E58, C61, F41
Keywords: ASEAN, monetary policy, optimal policy rules, social welfare function.
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21 Introduction
Monetary policy is a key instrument for stabilising short-run ￿ uctuations in an economy.
The conduct of monetary policy itself, however, is recognised to have implications towards
the state of social welfare. The performance of monetary policy is deemed as e¢ cient or
optimal if it minimises the aggregate social loss that has to be paid by economic agents
in general. The Barro and Gordon (1983) type of ad-hoc aggregate loss function and its
variants have been extensively used in the monetary policy literature as an objective to
be minimised when identifying an optimal policy. This ad-hoc aggregate loss function
commonly consists of arguments on variations in in￿ ation and the output gap.
Signi￿cant e⁄orts in analysing e¢ cient monetary policy have since grown in the literature.
This is done by focusing the analysis on how to deliver monetary policy that minimises
the variability of both output and in￿ ation. De Brouwer and O￿ Regan (1997), Fuhrer
(1997) and Cecchetti et al. (2006), for example, construct an output￿ in￿ ation variability
frontier that represents the in￿ ation/output-gap trade-o⁄ as a basis to analyse monetary
policy e¢ ciency. Many others address the issue by ranking the welfare implications of
di⁄erent monetary policy setups, or even straightforwardly estimate an optimal monetary
policy rule that optimises the aggregate loss function (see, for example, Rotemberg and
Woodford, 1998; Clarida et al., 1999; Batini et al., 2003; Gali and Monacelli, 2005; Dennis
and Soderstrom, 2006).
The analysis of optimal monetary policy is normally conducted by way of ￿ targeting rules￿ ,1
which relies on an ad-hoc aggregate loss function (commonly interpreted as the policy
maker￿ s loss function). An optimal policy feedback rule is then de￿ned as the policy in-
strument reaction function that minimises the loss. Another way to analyse monetary
policy e¢ ciency is through maximising the welfare impact of that policy. That is, a policy
feedback rule is regarded as optimal if it maximises the aggregate utility of the represen-
tative economic agents. To this end, the aggregate loss function (commonly interpreted
as the social loss function) is derived from the representative agent￿ s utility function as
discussed in Woodford (2003).
Although issues concerning the optimal conduct of monetary policy have been widely dis-
cussed in the literature, the discussions have mostly concentrated on the cases of advanced
economies. Application of this analysis to developing economies is very limited. The ob-
jective of this paper is to contribute to the discussion on this issue by examining the
cases of ￿ve developing ASEAN economies; namely Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines,
Singapore and Thailand.
In analysing the above cases, this paper uses a linearised estimated small open economy
model to represent the set of dynamic constraints facing each of the ASEAN-5 economies.
Based on the ￿ deep￿parameters that identify the representative agent￿ s utility for these
economies, the paper derives an aggregate social loss function that serves the role of
calculating the metric of welfare. This welfare criterion is then used to analyse the fully
optimal monetary policy environment for the economies under consideration.2 The paper
also looks at the welfare implications under the current monetary policy regime pursued by
each of the ASEAN-5 economies. By comparing the resulting metric for welfare obtained
under the fully optimal monetary policy environment and the one obtained under the
current regime, this study shows that the conduct of monetary policy in all of the sample
countries tends to be sub-optimal. By way of example, it is also shown that room for
improving the welfare outcome of the policy exists, even when pursuing a simple policy
1See Svensson (1999) for a discussion on the distinction between instrument rules and targeting rules.
2The term ￿fully optimal￿here refers to the situation where the resulting form of the optimal monetary
policy feedback rule is not constrained to follow some certain (simple) functional forms. That is, the optimal
feedback rule depends on all the state variables included in the system of dynamic constraints representing
the economy.
3feedback rule adopted by the current regime.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 derives the relevant utility-based
welfare criterion to be used in analysing the optimality of monetary policy in the sam-
ple ASEAN-5 economies. Section 3 discusses the methodology applied to analyse the
welfare implication of monetary policy under the fully optimal environment. Section 4
characterises the optimisation problem and analyses the welfare implication of conducting
monetary policy optimally in each of the economies. Section 5 looks at the welfare im-
plications of the current monetary policy regime, and discusses its optimality. Section 6
contemplates the possibility of improving the conduct of monetary policy for the sample
countries. Section 7 concludes.
2 Utility-Based Welfare Criterion
The natural welfare criterion for the class of simple small open New Keynesian economy
models considered in this paper is represented by the level of expected stream of utility of




￿t [U (Ct ￿ Ht) ￿ V (Nt)] (1)
U(￿) in equation (1) represents the HH utility out of consumption, which is assumed
to be a⁄ected positively by the di⁄erence between current consumption decision and an
exogenous external stock of habit formation within each period. The second term in
equation (1), V (Nt), represents the disutility generated out of working. This term is
assumed to be positively a⁄ected by the number of hours working at each period (Nt).






Consumption (Ct) in (2) is an aggregation of an in￿nite number of di⁄erentiated goods






"￿1.3 The term ￿ is
the inverse elasticity of inter-temporal substitution. The external stock of habit formation
is assumed to be determined by past aggregate average consumption level (Ht = hCt￿1).
This last variable (Ht) is taken as exogenous by each of the representative households at
each period t; since each HH is assumed to be too small to a⁄ect the aggregate average
consumption in the economy.









i=0 Nt (i)@i and ’ is the inverse elasticity of labour supply.
3The functional form of this aggregator follows Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) and " denotes the elasticity
of substitution between di⁄erentiated goods of the same origin.
42.1 The second-order approximation to the utility function
Following common practice in deriving the utility-based welfare criterion,4 the second-
order approximation to (1) is derived by taking a second-order Taylor series expansion of
the within period utility function (Ut ￿ Vt) evaluated at its steady state value. Due to its
additively separable characteristic, the second-order approximation of this utility function
can be conducted separately to each of the terms.
2.1.1 The consumption part
The second-order approximation to the consumption part of the within period utility is
as follows:
Ut = ￿ U + U ￿ C
￿





U ￿ C ￿ C
￿




￿ U and ￿ C are the steady state equilibrium values for U and C, respectively. U ￿ C and U ￿ C ￿ C
are the ￿rst and second derivative of U with respect to C, evaluated at ￿ C; and O
￿
k￿k3￿
summarises the higher order terms of the expansion, which is assumed to be very small.
Given the particular functional form in equation (2), the above approximation can also be
written as:
Ut = ￿ U + (1 ￿ h)















where ct denotes the log deviation of consumption from its steady state value.
In the small open economy model considered for the analysis here, the demand for do-
mestic output (y) under the market clearing condition is positively a⁄ected by domestic
consumption (c), foreign income (y￿) and real exchange rate (q); and negatively related
to the shock to the law of one price ( ). Demand for domestic output in this case is
represented by the following output gap equation:








The real exchange rate in equation (5) above is assumed to be governed by the following
international risk sharing condition:
(1 ￿ h)
￿






t in the above equation represent the relative deviation of the external habit
stock with respect to steady state consumption for the domestic small open economy and
the foreign sector respectively.
Substituting equation (6) into equation (5) eliminates the real exchange rate term in the
market clearing condition. That is:
yt =
(1 ￿ ￿)
2 (1 ￿ h) + ￿(2 ￿ ￿)￿￿
(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ h)
ct +
￿(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ h) ￿ ￿(2 ￿ ￿)￿￿













4See, e.g., Rotemberg and Woodford (1998), Erceg et al. (2000), Woodford (2003), Walsh (2003) and
Edge (2003) for the case of a closed economy; and Batini et al. (2003), Pappa (2004) and Gali and Monacelli
(2005) for the open economy case.
5Solving for ct from the above equation gives:
ct = a1yt ￿ a2y￿
t + a3 (Ht ￿ H￿
t ￿ ￿
q











Equation (7) can then be used to substitute for ct and c2
t in the second-order approximation





















The term t:i:p in equation (8) stands for the collection of terms that are independent of
monetary policy.
2.1.2 The disutility out of working
The second-order approximation to the disutility out of working term in the within period
utility is the following:
Vt = ￿ V + V ￿ N
￿





V ￿ N ￿ N
￿




￿ V and ￿ N are the equilibrium value of V and N, respectively. As with the case for the con-
sumption part of the utility function, given the particular functional form of the disutility
function in (3), the above approximation can also be written as:
Vt = ￿ V + ￿ N1+’nt +
1
2





with n denoting the log deviation of hours of labour from its steady state value.
As indicated earlier, total labour hours in each period t (Nt) is the aggregated number







representative production function utilised in the underlying small open economy model
used for the analysis of this paper is assumed to take the following form:
Yt(i) = BtNt(i)














= yt ￿ bt (10)
Expression (10) above can be used to substitute for nt and n2
t in the second-order approx-
imation of the disutility out of working in equation (9) to yield:







t + variyt (i)
￿
￿




62.2 The utility-based welfare criterion
The utility-based welfare criterion (Lt = Ut ￿ Vt) is obtained by combining the two second-























t + variyt (i)
￿￿
+ t:i:p + O
￿
k￿k3￿
When evaluated at the optimum steady state equilibrium, however, the marginal utility
of consumption has to be equal to the marginal disutility out of working for each of the
representative households. Since this requirement has to hold at the optimum, it is then
assumed that
￿ C1￿￿
(1￿h)￿a1 = ￿ N1+’ = ￿ at steady state. Therefore, the above equation can























Equation (12) implies that the within period utility-based loss function is not only deter-
mined by the output gap, but also by the dispersion of output across ￿rms as well. As
argued in Woodford (2003, Chapter 6), this last channel is in fact the one that invokes
the relevance of price stability for welfare beyond the mere association between in￿ ation
and the aggregate output gap.
Speci￿cally, assume that each of the individual ￿rms faces a constant elasticity demand
curve of the form yt (i) = yt ￿ "(pD;t (i) ￿ pt). This particular demand curve implies that
variyt (i) = "2varipD;t (i) (13)






















Expression (14) implies that reducing price dispersion across ￿rms, in addition to stabilis-
ing the output gap, is also an appropriate policy objective for a policy maker. As the price
set at ￿rm level is a⁄ected by the ￿ uctuations in the aggregate price level, the objective to
reduce price dispersion can also be achieved through stabilising the aggregate price level.
Further, given equation (14), the expression for the level of the representative household￿ s








The aggregate price level in the underlying model used for the analysis here is formed by a
weighted average of both the price of home and imported goods, pt = (1￿￿)pD;t +￿pF;t.
Alternatively, pt can also be written as pt ￿ Ei[(1 ￿ ￿)pD;t (i) + ￿pF;t]. Therefore, the
aggregate price in￿ ation (pt ￿ pt￿1 = ￿t) can be expressed as the following:
￿t = pt ￿ pt￿1
= Ei [(1 ￿ ￿)pD;t (i) + ￿pF;t ￿ pt￿1] (16)
7No individual ￿rm i, however, possesses perfect information over the price setting of the
domestic import retailers. To simplify the analysis, it is assumed that ￿rm i expectation
about pF;t is simply its past value plus an adjustment made through indexing the price
to the last period aggregate in￿ ation; that is, Ei (pF;t) = pF;t￿1 + ￿￿t￿1: Given these
assumptions and a Calvo (1983) staggered price mechanism of the domestic producing
￿rms, equation (16) can be expressed as follows:




D;t (i) + ￿pF;t￿1 + ￿￿￿t￿1 ￿ pt￿1
￿
= (1 ￿ ￿D)
￿
(1 ￿ ￿)pnew
D;t (i) + ￿pF;t￿1 ￿ pt￿1
￿
+ ￿￿￿t￿1 (17)
Moreover, since pt￿1 , pF;t￿1 and ￿t￿1 are known at period t, each ￿rm i in the economy
will have the same expected value for any of those variables at any time t. Therefore,




















(1 ￿ ￿D)(1 ￿ ￿)
￿t￿1
￿￿
where, given the Calvo (1983) price setting mechanism, can also be written as,










which, given the expression set out in equation (17), boils down to
￿t = ￿D￿t￿1 +
￿D
(1 ￿ ￿D)(1 ￿ ￿)
￿2
t (18)













Further, equation (19) above can be used to substitute out the discounted sum of varipD;t (i)
in equation (15), the discounted sum of the utility of the representative household (Wt).








The term Losst in the equation above represents the within period loss due to variations















is the weight for output gap variations.
3 Measuring Welfare Under Optimal Monetary Policy
Equation (20) can be considered as a representative for the aggregate social welfare func-
tion of an economy. A benevolent policy maker (represented by a monetary authority in
8this particular case), whose objective is to maximise the level of social welfare (minimising
the aggregate loss), should then target its policy to maximise equation (20) subject to a
set of dynamic constraints representing the dynamics of the economy under consideration.
The general form of the dynamic constraint faced by a monetary authority can be written
in the following matrix representation:
A0yt = A1 yt￿1 +A2 Etyt+1 +A3 xt +A4 vt; with vt ￿ iid[0;￿] (21)
where yt is a vector of time t endogenous variables in the system; xt is a scalar or vector of
time t control variable(s); vt is a vector of iid innovations to the economy with variance-
covariance matrix ￿; and A0, A1, A2, A3 and A4 are conformable matrices containing
structural parameters of the economic model under consideration.
The aggregate loss function for an economy can also be presented in a matrix form related










where W is a conformable matrix containing the weights for each of the arguments entering
the aggregate loss function. In the context of the functional form given in equation (20),
the elements of W are all zero, except for those related to the elements of y that represent
in￿ ation (￿) and output gap (y):
3.1 Optimal policy under precommitment
Under an optimal pre-commitment policy regime, a monetary authority pre-commits to a
policy plan for all the remaining periods by optimising its policy once only, at some initial
period (t = 0). In a rational expectation environment, the time t + 1 variables can be
stated as their expected values plus an expectation error. Therefore,
yt+1 = Etyt+1+ut+1 (23)
Further, (23) can be used to eliminate the expectation operator in (21).
In order to solve for the optimal policy under pre-commitment, a monetary authority min-
imises the objective function in equation (22) subject to a set of the dynamic constraints









A0yt ￿A1 yt￿1 ￿A2 Etyt+1 ￿A3 xt ￿A4 vt
￿
]
￿t in the above equation is a vector of Lagrange multiplier for period t. Di⁄erentiating the
above Langragian problem with respect to xt, yt and ￿t yields the ￿rst order necessary
5Alternatively, the problem can also be solved using the conventional dynamic programming method
as shown in Backus and Dri¢ ll (1986); as applied in e.g. Jensen (2002).




0 ￿t ￿ ￿￿1A0
2￿t￿1 ￿ ￿A0




3￿t = 0 (25)
@L
@￿t
= A0yt ￿A1 yt￿1 ￿A2 Etyt+1 ￿A3 xt ￿A4 vt = 0 (26)
As is well-known, following the argument put forward by Kydland and Prescott (1977), a
problem with solving for optimal policy under pre-commitment in the presence of forward-
looking constraints is that the solution is generally not time consistent. This problem
arises due to the fact that an optimal commitment policy designed at the initial period is
no longer optimum in the eyes of a policy maker, once the private sector expectation is
formed under that given policy. To circumvent this problem, however, one can impose an
additional set of constraints on the acceptable values of the initial conditions on y￿1 and
￿￿1 that are self-consistent. That is, the chosen policy subject to these constraints would
also satisfy constraints of exactly the same form in the future periods.6
Dennis (2007) shows that constraining y￿1 = ￿ y (the steady state equilibrium value of
y) and ￿￿1 = 0 give su¢ cient restrictions to guarantee that the above argument holds.
Given y￿1 = ￿ y and ￿￿1 = 0, the set of ￿rst order necessary conditions in equation (24),
(25) and (26) holds for every time t ￿ 0. Therefore, they can be represented as the























































The second-order di⁄erence system in (27) can be solved using the method of undetermined-





























or, in more compact notation:
st = Hst￿1 +Gvt (29)
The optimal commitment rule is embedded in (28), particularly represented by the third
row of the vector on the left hand side and its corresponding terms in the right hand side of
the equation. Aside from responding to the development in the state variables, the vector
of policy variables also responds to the Lagrange multipliers of the system. These Lagrange
multipliers enter the optimal policy feedback rule in order to ensure the validations of past
formation of the private sector expectations by the current policy maker.
To measure the welfare implication from this optimal pre-commitment policy, one can
proceed by calculating the resulting loss given the optimal policy. To do so, the loss
6See, for example, discussion in Benigno and Woodford (2006a,b).
7Ways to implement the method can be found in Binder and Pesaran (1995), McCallum (1998), Uhlig
(1999) or Christiano (2002).




































to match the elements in s. Assuming that 0 < ￿ < 1 and the stability properties in (29)










where P = K+￿H0PH.8 Given the associated s, ￿, ￿ and the relevant coe¢ cient
matrices, the value of the loss function can be evaluated.
3.2 Optimal policy under discretion
Under an optimal discretionary policy, a monetary authority re-optimises its policy on a
period by period basis. Any set of policy feedback parameters chosen in one period does
not impose any restriction on the set of possible feedback parameters for the subsequent
policy maker. However, a feedback rule chosen in one period does a⁄ect the dynamics of
the economy through time. Therefore, the dynamics of the economy in this case follow a
Stackelberg-Nash equilibrium, where the policy maker optimising today can be considered
as a Stackelberg leader, while the other economic agents and the subsequent policy makers
are the Stackelberg followers.
Due to its inability to control the future dynamics of the economy, a monetary authority
optimising at time t assumes that (in equilibrium) all the endogenous variables and the
policy instruments in the system are governed by their relevant state-endogenous variables.
That is,
yt = H1yt￿1 +H2 vt (32)
xt = F 1yt￿1 +F 2 vt (33)
where H1, H2, F 1 and F 2 are the time-invariant matrices of parameters that govern the
dynamics of the economy, once the optimal discretionary policy problem is solved. Note
also that at the optimum, equation (33) represents the optimal feedback rule for the vector
of policy variables that a policy maker will choose if they are to minimise the relevant loss
function under consideration.
Substituting equation (32) into equation (21) gives
Dyt = A1 yt￿1 +A3 xt +A4 vt (34)
where D = A0 ￿A2 H1. This form of dynamic constraint system sets the information
8This result is obtained by exploiting the properties of a convergent in￿nite series; where for 0 < ￿ < 1












j = X ￿ W. Consequently, X can be solved by ￿nding a ￿xed
point solution to X = W+￿￿
0jX￿
j.
11of how future policy makers respond to movements in yt. This information is taken into
account by today￿ s policy maker in setting its policy. It is in this sense that the current
policy maker leads the future policy maker decisions.






































with S = W+￿H0
1SH1:
To discover the optimal discretionary policy rule, one can simply proceed by minimising
the social loss function in (36) subject to the system of dynamic constraints in (34).
Given the problem at hand, one can substitute equation (34) into (36) and solve for an
unconstrained optimisation problem instead. That is,
Loss(t;1) =
￿
A1yt￿1 +A3 xt +A4 vt
￿0 D0￿1SD￿1 ￿


























= F 1yt￿1 +F 2 vt (37)
The last line in the above expression comes from the expression set out in equation (33)
earlier. Substituting the last line above ￿equation (37) ￿into equation (34), one gets
yt = D￿1 ￿
(A1 +A3 F 1)yt￿1+(A4 +A3 F 2)vt
￿
= H1yt￿1 +H2 vt (38)
Notice that both S and D are implicit functions of H1, H1, F 1 and F 2. Consequently,
one needs to ￿nd a ￿xed point solution for equation (37) and (38) in order to get the
desired matrices of the optimal parameters under a discretionary regime.
The above discussion demonstrates that the approach used to solve for an optimum discre-
tionary policy problem is done through formulating it as a recursive optimisation problem
and iterating backward through time to solve for the Markov-perfect Nash-equilibrium.
The resulting equilibrium is then time-consistent, as pointed out by, among others, Dennis
(2004b).9
9For a proof, see, for example, Dockner et al. (2000, Theorem 4.3).
124 Monetary Policy in the ASEAN-5: Commitment vs. Dis-
cretion
This section applies the approaches above to measure welfare implications of pursuing op-
timal monetary policy for the cases of ASEAN-5 countries. The set of dynamic constraints
used in the optimisation problem are the log-linearised version of an extended Gali and
Monacelli (2005) small open economy model with ten equations governing the dynamics
of the economy as presented in the Appendix to this paper. The model is a simple ver-
sion of a dynamic New Keynesian small open economy model, which features imperfect
competition and nominal price rigidities, an incomplete pass-through e⁄ect in the import
sector with a staggered price setting in the domestic imported goods market, and external
habit formation in the consumer￿ s utility.
To obtain results for both an optimal monetary policy feedback rule under pre-commitment
and under discretion, the objective function stated in equation (22) is optimised subject to
the dynamic constraints using the algorithm proposed by Dennis (2007). This algorithm
has an advantage in allowing one to cast the optimisation constraints in terms of their
structural form, as set out in expression (21), rather than having to convert them into
a state-space representation, as commonly required in the existing alternative algorithms
(e.g. the algorithm set out in Backus and Dri¢ ll, 1986; Soderlind, 1999). Therefore, it
o⁄ers convenience in setting up the optimisation problem.
4.1 Setting up the problem
The relevant dynamic constraints (as shown by the set of equations in the Appendix)
for each of the ASEAN-5 economies are ￿tted into the system expressed in (21). The
equation for the interest reaction function, however, is discarded when setting up yt.
This is done in order to free the monetary policy feedback rule to be determined by the
optimisation process without posing any particular constraint on its form. To conduct the
optimisation, the coe¢ cient matrices A0, A1, A2, A3 and A4 for each of the economies in
the group of ASEAN-5 countries are ￿lled with the relevant parameters obtained from the
empirical estimation of the small open economy model done in Ramayandi (2008). Table
1 summarises the ￿deep￿structural parameters used to conduct the optimisation.
As discussed in section 2.2, the weight coe¢ cient for in￿ ation variation in the aggregate
loss function (22) is normalised to 1. The weight for output gap (!) for each country can
be calculated using the parameters supplied in Table 1. However, as shown in the last part
of section 2.2, ! is also determined by the elasticity of substitution between di⁄erentiated
goods of the same origin ("). For the purpose of computation, this last parameter is set
according to the value used for calibrating a similar model in Gali and Monacelli (2005).
That is, " is set to be equal to 6 for all of the countries, which implies a common average
steady state mark-up value (￿) of 1.2 for all economies.10 Given these parameters, the
weight for output gap variations in the aggregate loss function (!) for each country under
consideration is reported in Table 2.
An interesting observation emerges from Table 2. Under the approach employed to derive
the approximate utility-based welfare criterion in section 2, the weight for output gap
variation in the aggregate loss function is very small relative to the weight for the variation
in in￿ ation.11 In the terminology of Svensson (1999, 2000), this form of aggregate social
loss function approximates the one he termed as a strict in￿ ation targeting regime.
10Note that at a steady state equilibrium, ￿ =
"
"￿1 in this class of model.
11Based on the derivation of this parameter in section 2.2, the lower the steady state mark-up value in
the economy (that is, the more competitive the market for a good from the same origin in the economy),
the lower the relative weight for output gap variation in the aggregate loss function would be.
13Table 1: Structural parameters of the small open economy model
Parameter Indonesia Malaysia Philippines Singapore Thailand
￿ 0:30 0:65 0:49 0:80 0:48
￿ 0:963 0:988 0:972 0:992 0:984
￿ 0:92 0:49 0:49 0:61 0:65
￿ 0:86 0:32 0:09 0:17 0:74
￿D 0:92 0:82 0:76 0:83 0:94
￿F 0:91 0:89 0:77 0:89 0:98
’ 1:99 1:99 1:00 4:79 1:49
￿ 0:003 0:39 0:08 0:29 0:43
h 0:77 0:55 0:97 0:25 0:81
￿  0:99 0:99 0:88 0:99 0:85
￿b 0:61 0:81 0:89 0:91 0:60
￿i 0:52 0:69 0:55 0:85 0:70
￿1 1:78 1:66 0:72 1:27 2:65
￿2 1:04 0:19 1:60 0:94 0:00
￿b 0:46 0:16 0:01 0:01 0:37
￿c 0:03 0:05 0:02 0:12 0:05
￿i 0:035 0:07 0:02 0:006 0:016
￿  0:08 0:06 0:10 0:03 0:07
￿q 0:09 0:10 0:05 0:14 0:11







Given values for the parameters described in Tables 1 and 2, all the coe¢ cient matrices
needed to solve the optimisation problem described earlier (W, A0, A1, A2, A3 and A4)
can be characterised for each of the countries. The results of each of the exercises are
reported and discussed in what follows.
4.2 Results: Commitment vs. discretion
Table 3 summarises the results of the simulation exercise conducted for the cases of optimal
monetary policy (i.e. under pre-commitment and under discretion). The table provides
three main results that are of interest for both cases. The ￿rst two rows spell out the
metric for the welfare implication (the value of the loss function) under the two policy
regimes for each of the countries. The third row gives the measure of welfare gain from
moving from a discretionary policy regime to adopting a pre-commitment regime. This
gain in welfare is measured as the size of relative change in the value of the metric of
welfare as one moves from adopting an optimum discretionary policy to an optimum pre-
commitment policy (welfare gain = 1 ￿ LC
LD, where LC is the value of the loss function
under pre-commitment and LD is the value of the loss function under discretion). The last
part of the table shows the comparison of the unconditional variances of four key variables
￿in￿ ation (￿), output gap (y), real exchange rate (q) and interest rate (i) ￿between the
two policy regimes.12
12To obtain the unconditional variances, I use the doubling algorithm of Hansen and Sargent (1998)
to solve for the ￿xed point solution to the unconditional variance-covariance matrix of all the variables
14Table 3: Comparison of optimum monetary policy rules
Indonesia Malaysia The Philippines Singapore Thailand
100 x Loss (PC) 0:0045 0:0012 0:0002 0:0001 0:0004
100 x Loss (D) 0:0060 0:0013 0:0003 0:0001 0:0006
Welfare gain 0:2535 0:1193 0:3242 0:0529 0:3886
Unconditional variances (under pre-commitment):
￿ (x 105) 0:3466 0:0171 0:0059 0:0001 0:0626
y 0:0971 0:0420 0:0013 0:0067 0:0314
q 0:5935 0:0373 0:0050 0:0014 0:1557
i 0:1166 0:0055 0:0054 0:0013 0:2014
Unconditional variances (under discretion):
￿ (x 105) 2:3132 0:2174 0:1454 0:0058 0:3276
y 0:0918 0:0420 0:0013 0:0067 0:0288
q 0:6052 0:0377 0:0048 0:0014 0:1615




The results presented in Table 3 are largely consistent with conventional wisdom from the
literature, which argues that an optimal pre-commitment policy is superior in terms of
welfare implication. Although with varying degrees, the superiority of the optimal pre-
commitment policy holds for all the ￿ve countries in the sample. The reason for this,
once the time-inconsistency problem has been dealt with appropriately, comes from the
fact that a policy maker is taking into account the e⁄ect of its policy on private sector
expectations when designing its policy. Therefore, resulting policies tend to drive more
socially optimal outcomes.
The monetary authority￿ s inability to pre-commit will penalise the economic welfare of
the economy. The literature records that a welfare gain from switching to an optimal
pre-commitment regime averages at around 20 per cent under simulations using di⁄erent
available macroeconomic dynamic models. For example, the simulation by Jensen (2002)
produces welfare gain of around 22 per cent; Dennis (2004b) simulates the welfare implica-
tion from switching regimes using the model given by Clarida et al. (1999) and produces a
welfare gain of around 26 per cent; Dennis and Soderstrom (2006) report a gain of similar
magnitude (around 21 to above 30 per cent) when conducting the simulation using a larger
model of Orphanides and Wieland (2000), but relatively smaller magnitude of around 14
to 20 per cent of gains when simulating using the model from Fuhrer and Moore (1995).
For the case of the ￿ve ASEAN economies in this paper, the gains from moving from an op-
timal discretionary regime to a regime based on commitment are also found to be positive
in all cases. The welfare gain varies from a little over 5 per cent in the case of Singapore
to almost 39 per cent in the case of Thailand. This observation is largely in line with the
general observation obtained from using models with similar dynamic characteristics and
the timing of expectation formation in the literature as discussed above.13
According to the simulation results of the ￿ve ASEAN economies under consideration,
Thailand and the Philippines are among the top gainers, followed by Indonesia, Malaysia
and Singapore (where the gain from switching the regime is the smallest among the
involved in the system.
13Dennis and Soderstrom (2006) show that the timing of expectation formation matters for determining
the welfare gain from switching policy regime from discretion to commitment. In the case where expecta-
tions are formed using lagged information, the gain from switching regimes tend to drop signi￿cantly.
15sample). It therefore suggests that a radical change towards adopting an optimal pre-
commitment regime in conducting monetary policy will substantially bene￿t countries
like Thailand, the Philippines, Indonesia and Malaysia. In the case of Singapore, although
there will still be bene￿t, its magnitude is not going to be as large.
An optimal policy under pre-commitment is also generally recognised for leading to lower
volatility in in￿ ation and interest rates, but more volatility in the measure of the output
gap. In general, this feature is also con￿rmed by the simulation results for the ￿ve ASEAN
economies. Additionally, the simulation for these cases also points to a generally lower
volatility in the real exchange rate as well. Although the simulation con￿rms the higher
output gap volatility under a pre-commitment regime, the di⁄erence is relatively marginal
in each of the ASEAN-5 cases. This observation suggests that even though the objective
function used to conduct the analysis is close to Svensson￿ s (1999) strict in￿ ation target-
ing regime, the optimal pre-commitment policy will still produce superior outcomes for
stabilising the economy in general.
5 Welfare Under the Current State of Policy Feedback Rule
The previous section discussed the welfare implications of monetary policy under two
di⁄erent optimal monetary policy environments, pre-commitment and discretion. Under
these policy environments, the optimal policy takes the form of a feedback rule on the
vector of state variables in the system. That is, all the state variables are used as relevant
information for determining the movements in the policy variable (the interest rate in this
particular case). As mentioned earlier, in the case where a monetary authority is able
to pre-commit to a single policy plan for the remaining periods, the policy feedback rule
utilises more information by also including the vector of Lagrange multipliers obtained
from the optimisation. This latter feature represents the cost that the policy maker has
to pay for honouring the commitments made in the past. However, this cost is, to an
extent, also playing a role in driving the pre-commitment regime to deliver a relatively
more e¢ cient social welfare outcome.
Although the policy feedback rules under the optimal pre-commitment include the vec-
tor of Lagrange multipliers in their set of monetary policy information, this vector can
always be eliminated by substituting them out using the relevant relationships between
this vector and the vector of state variables obtained from the ￿rst order necessary con-
ditions of the optimisation problem.14 By doing so, both the policy feedback rules under
pre-commitment and under discretion will have the same set of information, but di⁄erent
parameters.
The above discussion highlights the point that an optimal feedback rule adopted by a
monetary authority in conducting its policy is not simple. But even if that is the case,
representing a policy feedback rule in a simpler representation, as widely discussed in the
literature, still o⁄ers bene￿ts. Among others, a simple policy feedback rule can generally
provide a compact representation of the actual policy decision taken by the monetary
authority, as long as it is able to approximate the setting of a policy instrument without
too much deviation. A simple approximation of policy feedback rules that falls into this
category is also preferable since it is generally easier to understand for the private agents,
especially when guiding them in forming their expectations. However, simple feedback
rules are, by construction, ine¢ cient relative to the fully optimum ones.
Particularly in the case of the ￿ve ASEAN economies considered in this paper, where the
actual conduct of monetary policy is not being disclosed openly, such an approximation
14This substitution can be done since a linear relationship between the Lagrange multipliers and the
state vector exists in the class of problem discussed in this paper. See Backus and Dri¢ ll (1986) for the
discussions.
16is helpful in understanding the conduct of monetary policy. For the sample countries
under consideration, an approximation to the policy feedback rule in the form of a simple
monetary policy reaction function performs relatively well. These simple rules mainly
follow the Taylor (1993) type of policy reaction function of the form:
it = (1 ￿ ￿i)(￿1Et￿t+n + ￿2yt) + ￿iit￿1 + ￿i
t (39)
where it, Et￿t+n,15 yt and ￿i
t are the interest rate, expected in￿ ation, output gap and the
unexpected component of monetary policy innovation, respectively, and ￿1, ￿2 and ￿i are
the relevant parameters with the assigned values for each country as stated in Table 1.
Although the formulation in equation (39) is often considered to be more appropriately
interpreted as an equilibrium relationship among endogenous variables (Svensson, 2003),
the characterised simple rule above is taken as the representation of a simple monetary
policy feedback rule for each of the ASEAN-5 countries analysed in this paper. Using these
to govern the movement in interest rates, the value of the social loss function (as a metric
of the welfare implication of monetary policy) for each of the countries can be calculated.
The resulting values can then be compared to the values obtained under the optimal policy
environments to get a rough picture of how e¢ cient the conduct of monetary policy has
been.
5.1 Measuring welfare under the current feedback rule
Welfare implications under the current feedback policy rule, as represented by the simple
Taylor-type rule in equation (39), can be measured by taking the rule into account when
de￿ning the dynamic constraints of the economy. Unlike the treatment under the fully
optimal policy environment, where the monetary policy feedback rule is to be determined
by the optimisation process, the policy rule under this environment is restricted to take
the form stated in equation (39). Therefore, one can re-arrange the system of dynamic
































or, in more compact notation:
B0zt = B1 zt￿1 +B2 zt+1 +B3 vt (40)
{1;2 are vectors containing the relevant parameters that characterise the relationship be-
tween the interest rate (the policy variable) and the endogenous variables in yt+1;t in
the simple feedback rule, respectively. {3 is a vector containing 1 for the element corre-





in vt and zero
otherwise.16
Expression (40) above simply stacks the simple policy reaction function into the system
of dynamic constraints as summarised in equation (21) and re-arranges its form. Con-
sequently, equation (40) gives a complete summary of the dynamics of the economy as
presented in Appendix ??. Given this, one can rewrite the expression in (22) in terms of
15n = 1 applies to all the ASEAN-5 countries under consideration except for Singapore, where n = 0.
16Note, however, the system representation in (40) applies generally to all the ASEAN-5 economies
except for Singapore. In the latter case, the policy instrument is only reacting to the contemporaneous
development in both in￿ ation and the output gap. Therefore, the vector {2 contains non-zero parameters
for the elements that correspond to ￿t and yt in yt and zero otherwise. On the other hand, the vector {1
is a zero vector in this case.
17zt rather than yt, and solve for the value of the social loss function based on the approach
explained for solving the values under optimal policy environments discussed earlier.17
5.2 Results
Table 4 summarises the values of the social loss function under the current policy feedback
rule employed for each of the ASEAN-5 countries. The table also spells out the parameter
values characterising the policy reaction function in each country and the corresponding
unconditional variances for in￿ ation, output gap, real exchange rate and interest rate.
Table 4: Welfare implications of the current policy
Indonesia Malaysia The Philippines Singapore Thailand
100 x Loss 0:5856 0:2328 0:0864 1:9795 0:0142
Policy parameters:
￿1 1:7800 1:6600 0:7196 1:2700 2:6500
￿2 1:0400 0:1900 1:5960 0:9382 0:0000
￿i 0:5200 0:6900 0:5456 0:8525 0:7000
Unconditional variances:
￿ 0:0072 0:0029 0:0010 0:0310 0:0001
y 0:0033 0:0289 0:0003 0:0091 0:1098
q 0:1320 0:0200 0:0146 0:0021 0:2267
i 0:0115 0:0033 0:0011 0:0301 0:0007
An obvious observation immediately stands out from comparing the set of values for the
loss functions in Table 4 with the ones obtained under the optimal policy regimes reported
in Table 3. Values obtained under the current simple policy feedback rule are much higher
than those obtained under the fully optimal rules. Observation of the di⁄erence in the
magnitude of the corresponding unconditional variance of in￿ ation o⁄ers an explanation
for this outcome. As the metric of the loss functions di⁄er enormously, the di⁄erences in
unconditional variance of in￿ ation are also massive. Under the loss function that approxi-
mates Svensson￿ s strict in￿ ation regime, the optimal rules work their way to minimise the
unconditional variance of in￿ ation. Therefore, it minimises the social welfare function.
This mechanism does not seem to be as pronounced in the case of the current simple
policy feedback rule. Consequently, the latter case is characterised by higher values of the
loss function as an implication.
A large di⁄erence between the metric of welfare obtained under the current policy rule and
the one obtained under a utility-based social loss function, however, is not surprising. A
similar observation also appears in Batini et al. (2003), where simple policy feedback rules
that optimise an ad-hoc loss function return higher values when applied to a loss function
derived from a utility function. This observation indicates that the simple policy feedback
rules reported in Table 4 are not designed to optimise the speci￿ed social loss function
used to calculate the metric for welfare implications in this paper. In other words, the
likely representation of the simple policy feedback rule for each of the ASEAN-5 countries
analysed in this paper suggests that the monetary authority in these countries are not
















18optimising the social loss function as derived earlier in the paper. Even if they were
optimising at all, the form of the objective function must have been di⁄erent.
The last point described in the previous paragraph is supported by di⁄erences in the
variance of the four key variables reported in Table 3 and 4. Simulations for the cases
of Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines suggest a lower variance for output gap under
the simple feedback rule. This di⁄erence hints at the possibility that monetary authorities
in these three countries may give more attention to stabilising the output gap in their
actual policy setting than what is suggested by their corresponding utility-based welfare
criterion. A similar argument also applies for the lower real exchange rate variability under
the simple policy feedback rule reported in the cases of Indonesia and Malaysia. Although
these two countries may not be explicitly targeting their real exchange rate, a low variance
of this variable produced under the simple policy rule does hint at the possibility that a
di⁄erent mechanism is pursued in maximising the objective of their policy.
Aside from in￿ ation variability, another consistent di⁄erence in variability is found in the
case of the interest rate. Unconditional variances of the interest rate simulated under
the current simple policy feedback rule consistently fall below those obtained under the
optimal policy regime simulations for most of the ￿ve ASEAN economies. Except for
the case of Singapore, the speci￿ed rules used to represent the current policy regime
consistently deliver lower variability in the rate of interest. These ￿ndings provide a
strong suggestion about the preference for smoothing the interest rate ￿ uctuations of the
monetary authorities in these countries. In other words, it suggests that these monetary
authorities tend to prefer stability in their policy instrument, and hence, avoid overly
aggressive policy responses that can lead to wild ￿ uctuations in the policy instrument.
Findings on relatively higher variability in all of the four key variables under the current
feedback rule for the case of Singapore require further discussion. At a glance, these
￿ndings may point to a conclusion that the simple policy rule employed to characterise
the current conduct of monetary policy in Singapore is practically ine¢ cient. However,
there is also a possibility that the current simple rule employed in this particular case
may su⁄er from an instrument approximation bias. The monetary policy in Singapore
is primarily conducted through managing the Singapore dollar exchange rate against an
undisclosed trade-weighted basket of currencies of Singapore￿ s major trading partners
and competitors. Consequently, exchange rate targeting would be the most appropriate
representation of monetary policy in Singapore (for example, see discussions in Parrado,
2004; McCallum, 2006). The use of the interest rate as a proxy for the policy instrument
in this case could potentially invite an approximation bias, and the simulation results for
Singapore reported in Table 4 hinted at this potential issue.
In summary, simulations conducted under the current state of simple feedback rules char-
acterising monetary policy in the ￿ve ASEAN countries produce sub-optimal welfare impli-
cations for each of the economies. From observing di⁄erences in the implied unconditional
variances for four key macro-economic variables reported in Tables 3 and 4, this ￿nding
may have come about because monetary authorities in these economies may actually be
optimising over a di⁄erent objective function when setting up their policy.
6 Room for Improvement?
A question that naturally follows the assessment made in the previous section would
concern the issue of possible room for improving the monetary policy performances. More
speci￿cally, can one identify di⁄erent characterisations of the given form of simple policy
feedback rule that optimises the social loss function? An obvious approach to address
this question would be to ￿nd a policy feedback rule that represents a solution to the
constrained problem of optimising the social loss function, while restricting the solution
19to the form of the simple interest reaction function given in equation (39). When this
approach is applied to the problem characterised by the underlying parameter values
representing each of the sample ASEAN-5 economies, the optimisation exercise suggests
implausibly aggressive policy parameters for the restricted form of simple interest feedback
rule (39).
The literature on this topic also recognises the particular problem encountered above.
Batini et al. (2003), for example, come across a similar issue when ￿tting simple rules that
contain an interest smoothing argument to optimise their utility-based welfare function,
where interest rate variability does not appear as an explicit argument in the objective
function. Note that the representative interest reaction function used for each of the sample
economies in this paper, equation (39); includes an interest rate smoothing argument.
Optimising this kind of policy reaction function on a loss function that does not include an
ad-hoc added interest rate variability term, like the one in equation (22), could potentially
lead one to encounter the problem mentioned above. However, adding an ad-hoc interest
rate variability term into the utility-based loss function contradicts the rationale for using
the social loss function in assessing the policy￿ s welfare implications. On the other hand,
dropping the interest rate smoothing argument from equation (39) de￿es the econometric
evidence that monetary authorities in the ASEAN-5 sample prefer to smooth the interest
rate ￿ uctuations.
By way of compromise on the above issues, this paper explores the possibility for the
given form of a simple policy feedback rule in equation (39) to improve social welfare by
searching for a set of policy parameters that could potentially bring about around 50-70
per cent relative welfare gain from the current characterisation of the simple rules.18 In
doing so, two more restrictions are added when conducting the search. First, a new set of
policy parameters obtained should fall in the acceptable range of values for a simple policy
rule of this kind. Second, the search is terminated once the relative gain in the metric of
welfare hits the range mentioned.19
Given the above explanation, the resulting set of policy parameters obtained under the
search exercise should not be interpreted as a set that represents an optimal simple policy
feedback rule for the problem at hand. Rather, the resulting set of policy parameters can
only be construed as an example for the possible candidates from a set that delivers better
welfare outcomes. The objective of this exercise is merely to provide examples of room
for possible improvements that can be explored if monetary policy is to be conducted to
target better welfare implications. Two examples are presented in what follows. Both
examples retain the argument on the monetary authority preference over interest rate
(policy instrument) stability, as well as all the relevant assumptions used in the simulations
conducted previously in this paper.
6.1 Example 1: Altering all policy parameters
This example restricts the setting of monetary policy in each of the ￿ve ASEAN economies
to follow an interest rate feedback rule presented by equation (39). The set of estimated
policy parameters (￿1, ￿2 and ￿i) reported in Table 1 are not assumed to be an optimal
representation of the policy maker￿ s preference, and are hence ￿ exible to change. The
estimated policy parameters, however, is taken as the representative of the current policy
regime. Therefore, these parameters are used as the starting values to initiate the search.
Table 5 presents the outcome of this exercise.
18This range of potential welfare improvement is taken since (as shown in the following) the resulting
policy parameters still fall on some sensible range of values. In this exercise, the sensible range for the
policy parameters are set to be 0 < ￿1 < 10, ￿2 > 0 and 0 < ￿i < 1:
19The search is conducted using the Nelder-Mead simplex direct search algorithm (see Lagarias et al.,
1998, for a detailed explanation) contained in fminsearch routine in MATLAB, and truncated once the
20Table 5: Welfare implications of altering all policy parameters
Indonesia Malaysia The Philippines Singapore Thailand
100 x Loss 0:2000 0:090 0:0333 0:8699 0:0129
Welfare gain 0:6637 0:6084 0:6144 0:5605 0:0952
Policy parameters:
￿1 2:7813 2:0750 1:4703 1:3970 3:1211
￿2 0:3744 0:1140 0:6650 0:8444 ￿0:0001
￿i 0:7488 0:8280 0:7904 0:9378 0:6883
Unconditional variances:
￿ 0:0022 0:0010 0:0004 0:0132 0:0001
y 0:0152 0:0355 0:0011 0:0182 0:1071
q 0:1736 0:0220 0:0173 0:0037 0:2267
i 0:0084 0:0009 0:0006 0:0121 0:0008
Table 5 shows that in four out of the ￿ve ASEAN countries, the exercise conducted under
the above assumptions can comfortably deliver alternative values for the policy parameters,
which produce around a 55 to 70 per cent gain in welfare relative to that achieved under
the current estimated policy rules. Thailand￿ s case, however, comes out as an exception.
Implausibly, to get about 10 per cent relative gain in welfare, the policy instrument has
to react negatively to a positive development in the output gap. This possibly happens
because of the starting value for the parameter that governs the interest rate reactions to
the output gap (￿2) being zero in the case of Thailand.
The outcomes for all the countries in this example share general common features. To
improve its social welfare implications, the feedback rule needs to become more aggressive
in responding to developments in in￿ ation expectation, but less aggressive to developments
in the output gap. On top of that, this welfare improving simple feedback rule is also
characterised by more policy persistence (higher values for ￿i) in all cases. Although it
tends to be welfare improving, this better policy characterisation does not come without
cost. This better policy characterisation manages to bring about more stable in￿ ation and
interest rate only at the cost of relatively more volatility in the output gap and the real
exchange rate.
6.2 Example 2: Keeping the degree of interest persistence
This example is conducted under the same assumptions imposed in Example 1. It di⁄ers
only in the treatment of an interest rate smoothing term in the simple feedback rule. In
this example, the interest rate partial adjustment coe¢ cient (￿i) reported in Table 1 is
taken as optimally representing the preference of the policy maker. Consequently, the
value of this parameter for each of the ASEAN-5 economies is kept constant according the
estimated value reported in Table 1. That is, only the values for ￿1 and ￿2 are altered
in order to search for a better welfare outcome. The outcome of the exercise under the
assumption imposed in this second example is reported in Table 6.
As is also the case in Example 1, the exercise conducted under the assumption imposed
in this example delivers alternative values for the set of policy parameters that yield a 60
to 70 per cent welfare improvement relative to the base case of the estimated set of policy
parameters. Again, Thailand￿ s case turns out to be an outlier. Although the feedback
rule in the latter case does not have to be reacting negatively towards the output gap
developments in this example, the policy instrument has to react implausibly aggressively
boundaries for the additional restrictions are hit.
21Table 6: Welfare implications of policy alteration with ￿xed instrument persistence
Indonesia Malaysia The Philippines Singapore Thailand
100 x Loss 0:2117 0:0850 0:0280 0:6624 0:0121
Welfare gain 0:6386 0:6347 0:6758 0:6654 0:1489
Policy parameters:
￿1 2:7979 2:1476 1:7780 1:4676 3:4284
￿2 0:4290 0:1188 0:7016 0:7599 0:0007
￿i 0:5200 0:6900 0:5456 0:8525 0:7000
Unconditional variances:
￿ 0:0024 0:0009 0:0003 0:0103 0:0001
y 0:0124 0:0321 0:0007 0:0086 0:1061
q 0:1607 0:0238 0:0155 0:0021 0:2270
i 0:0099 0:0015 0:0007 0:0100 0:0008
to developments in in￿ ation expectation in order to get a more than 15 per cent gain in
welfare.
The common general features on the direction of changes in the way the policy instrument
should react to developments in in￿ ation expectations and the output gap to produce
better welfare outcomes in Example 1, also hold in this example. That is, in order to deliver
better welfare outcomes, the policy is required to be more aggressive to developments in
in￿ ation expectation and the other way around in the case of the output gap. However,
the costs for bringing more stable in￿ ation and interest rate found in Example 1 only
hold true for the cases of Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines in this example. In this
example, the relatively more stable in￿ ation and interest rates for the case of Singapore
turn out to be accompanied by a marginally more stable output gap and real exchange
rate.
6.3 A note on the examples
To an extent, the two examples above provide a picture of the existence of scope for
improving the welfare outcome of monetary policy for each of the ASEAN-5 countries.
This possible improvement can be achieved even by constraining the simple feedback rule
to take the same Taylor-type policy rule that approximates the current monetary policy
regime in these countries. Generally, both examples share common features in terms of
the directional change in the main policy parameters (￿1 and ￿2). There are, however, a
few particular cases that deserve some further notes.
The Philippines case shares the main common features with most of the other cases.
However, unlike the other cases, the Philippines case starts with a set of policy parameters
that does not adhere to the Taylor principle. Both Examples 1 and 2 suggest that the
welfare outcome in the case of the Philippines can be improved by switching its monetary
policy regime to one that pays more attention to developments in in￿ ation expectation
rather than to the output gap; i.e. a regime that adheres to the Taylor principle.
Thailand is an outlier in both examples. This problem may arise due to the fact that
the baseline representative regime in this case is only putting attention on the expected
in￿ ation developments to guide the direction of change in its policy stance. The trend
appearing within the examples explored in this section suggests that to improve the welfare
outcome, the feedback rule needs to become more aggressive in responding to developments
in in￿ ation expectation, but less aggressive towards the developments in the output gap.
In this particular case, there is practically no room for reducing the weight on output gap
22developments. Moreover, since the starting value for ￿1 has already been relatively high
in this particular case, the policy instrument often has to react implausibly aggressively
to developments in in￿ ation expectation in order to force in more stability to the already
relatively stable in￿ ation. Therefore, given the acceptable values for policy parameters, the
room for obtaining a relatively large welfare gain under the exercises set out in Example
1 and 2 in the case of Thailand is very limited.
Lastly, the case of Singapore in Example 2 also brings up an interesting observation. If
one is to keep the magnitude of the interest rate adjustment coe¢ cient in the feedback
rule (￿i) at its estimated value, then this example shows that there exist some better set of
policy parameters, which both improves the welfare outcome and delivers better stability
for the economy in general.
7 Concluding Remarks
The discussion provided in this paper has been focusing on the particular form of an
aggregate social loss function that is derived from a utility-based welfare criterion. Com-
parisons of the resulting unconditional variability in the four key macro-economic variables
reported in Tables 3, 4, 5 and 6, however, hint at the possibility that monetary authorities
in each of the ASEAN-5 countries may have some other considerations when setting up
their policy. Particularly for the cases of Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines, lower
output gap variability obtained under the simple policy rule suggests that the monetary
authorities in these countries may put larger weight on output gap variability relative to
the weight employed in the social welfare criterion derived in this paper. For the former
two cases, it is also shown that the real exchange rate turns out to be more stable under
the simple policy rule.
Assuming that the monetary authorities are optimising their particular objective function
in setting up their policy, the above ￿ndings suggest that the monetary authorities in the
ASEAN-5 countries are optimising against di⁄erent form of objectives. This argument is,
at least, re￿ ected in the way interest rate variability behaves under the simple rules. It
is very likely that when setting up their policy, the monetary authorities in the countries
considered in here prefer to smooth the pro￿le of their policy instrument. Therefore, the
likely policy maker￿ s objective function may take an ad-hoc form that puts relatively more
weight on the output gap and includes the interest rate and real exchange rate variability
arguments in it.20
The analysis in this paper, however, refrains from looking at the likely functional form for
the objective function of these monetary authorities. Instead, it focuses on analysing the
impact of monetary policy on the utility-based welfare criterion for each of the ASEAN-5
economies. Consistent with the literature, the results suggest that these countries will
be better-o⁄ if they conduct their monetary policy under a commitment rather than
under a discretionary regime. Furthermore, by assuming that the current policy regime
is represented by the estimated policy reaction functions for each of the economies, the
results suggest that scope for improving the performance of monetary policy in these
countries exists. By way of example, it is also shown that improving the e¢ ciency in the
performance of monetary policy is also possible even when keeping the particular form of
the policy rule. This improvement can be achieved by altering the feedback parameters
within the rule.
20The variant of ad-hoc types of objective function are commonly used for analysing monetary policy
in the literature. Some go even further by estimating the weight for the arguments appearing in this type
of ad-hoc form of objective function from the economic outcome; e.g. Dennis (2004a, 2006). This latter
approach is taken under the assumption that the policy maker￿ s optimising behaviour is re￿ ected in the
equilibrium relationship between policy instruments and the state variables in the representative system
of the economy.
23Some notes, however, need to be provided in interpreting the above assessment on the
possible improvement for conducting monetary policy. Especially for the case of Indonesia,
Malaysia and the Philippines, improvement in welfare discussed in Examples 1 and 2
implies higher variability in the measure of output gap as well as the real exchange rate.
If it turns out that the monetary authorities in these countries target both (or at least one)
of those two variables by weighing them heavily in their institutional objective functions,
then promoting a policy arrangement that improves welfare can become problematic.
Nonetheless, as the scope for improving monetary policy is open to the ASEAN-5 economies
under consideration, exploration of possible alternatives for improvement becomes a nat-
ural topic for future extension of the analysis provided in this paper. A possible alternative
for extension would be to see how a battery of di⁄erent simple monetary policy rules can
contribute towards narrowing the distance between the welfare implications of these rules
relative to the welfare implications of fully optimal monetary policy regimes. Another
equally interesting alternative to be explored is to see if having some sort of monetary
cooperation among the ASEAN-5 countries involved could help in improving the welfare
outcome.
The latter alternative mentioned above appears to be an attractive way to extend the
analysis of this paper for several reasons. First of all, the issue has been ￿ oated since
the Asian crisis in 1997.21 Economic interconnections among the ASEAN-5 countries
considered have also been growing and increasing at a faster rate lately. Further, as
shown in the discussions in this paper, monetary policy that is conducted based on a
commitment regime tends to produce superior welfare outcomes relative to the one that
is based on a discretionary regime. In practice, however, it is often di¢ cult to implement
a credible commitment regime. Having formal policy coordination within the region has
the potential to help in promoting the commitment technology to gain more credibility for
each of the monetary authorities involved. Therefore, it may potentially help in delivering
more e¢ cient welfare outcomes in the conduct of monetary policy.
21The issue of currency cooperation in ASEAN has actually been included as one of the four pillars of
the ASEAN roadmap for ￿nancial and monetary integration. (See the ASEAN fact sheet, 16
th of April
2007; available at http://www.aseansec.org/Fact%20Sheet/AEC/2007-AEC-009.pdf)
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27APPENDIX
Summary of the dynamic constraint:




[￿Et (￿t+1) + ￿￿t￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿)￿Dmct + ￿￿F t]
2. Marginal cost equation:
mct = ’yt +
￿
1 ￿ h
(ct ￿ hct￿1) +
￿
1 ￿ ￿
(qt ￿  t) ￿ (1 + ’)bt
3. Euler equation for consumption:
(ct ￿ hct￿1) = Et (ct+1 ￿ hct) ￿
(1 ￿ h)
￿
(it ￿ Et￿t+1) + ￿c
t
4. Goods market clearing condition:








5. International consumption risk sharing condition:
(1 ￿ h)
￿









6. Domestic aggregate productivity:
bt = ￿bbt￿1 + ￿b
t
7. Deviation of the law of one price:





























9. Interest reaction function:
it = (1 ￿ ￿i)(￿1Et￿t+n + ￿2yt) + ￿iit￿1 + ￿i
t
28